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Accident Reduction 
ACCIDENT REDUCTION THROUGH 
CREW RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 
Abstract 
The advent of technology has aided pilots navigate challenging terrain and avoid potentially disastrous 
weather systems, but the large mounts of information required to process have significantly hindered crews, some 
to overwhelming proportions with catastrophic results. Crew Resource Management (CRM) is a skill set utilized by 
crews to recognize, avoid, and mitigate risk. This report discusses some of the factors facing crews in today's flight 
environment and looks at some recent accidents that were attributed to CRM failures. Also, we'll analyze 
recommended changes to the traditional CRM concept and how they are being incorporated in commercial and general 
aviation. I'll also discuss the technological upgrades and the pilfdk associated with the advancement of avionics and 
computerized flight control. 
United Airlines Flight 173 was on final approach 
to Portland International Airport after an uneventful flight 
on December 28, 1978. The pilot noticed that he had not 
received the proper indication that the landing gear was 
down and locked into position. The nose gear light failed to 
illuminate green, the safe indication. The aircrew notified 
the air traffic control center and requested additional flight 
time to resolve the situation. The crew initiated the 
appropriate checklists while circling near the airfield. In 
spite of the crew's efforts, the nose gear landing light 
continued to glow red, still indicating the gear was not 
locked into position. Throughout the troubleshooting 
process the first officer and flight engineer informed the 
pilot that the plane was running low on fuel. The pilot either 
ignored the warnings or did not comprehend the messages. 
Approximately six miles southeast of the airport the aircraft 
crashed into a wooded residential neighborhood. This was 
the result of the engines being completely starved of fuel. 
Eight passengers and two crew members were killed, and 23 
people were seriously injured. Since there was no fuel to 
feed the fire, the death toll was relatively low for this type 
of disaster. The lack of communication skills under stress, 
situational awareness, team building, decision making and 
task allocation were all contributing factors in this accident. 
The post crash analysis determined that the green light 
indicator for the nose landing gear had a burned-out bulb. 
The nose gear had been down and locked the entire time. 
(NTSB, aviation-safety.net, 2007) 
Fast forward 28 years later. 
On August 27, 2006, about 6:06 am. eastern 
daylight time, Cornair flight 5 19 1, a Bombardier CL-600- 
2B19, crashed during takeoff fiom Blue Grass Airport, 
Lexington, Kentucky. The flight crew was instructed to take 
off h m  runway 22 but instead lined up the airplane on 
nmway 26 and began the takeoff roll. The airplane ran off 
the end of the runway and impacted the airport perimeter 
fence, trees, and terrain. The captain, flight attendant, and 47 
passengers were killed, and the first officer received serious 
injuries. The airplane was destroyed by impact forces and 
post crash fire. The National Transportation Safety Board 
determined that the probable cause of this accident was the 
flight crew members' failure to use available cues and aids 
to iden@ the airplane's location on the airport surface 
during taxi and their failure to cross-check and verify that 
the airplane was on the correct runway before takeoff. 
Contributing to the accident were the flight crew's non- 
pertinent c o n v d o n s  during taxi, which resulted in a loss 
of positional awareness. (NTSB, 2006) 
Flight 173's disaster was the catalyst for the 
aviation industry's recognition that technology alone was 
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not the cause of air mishaps. An evolution in how crews 
interacted in flight has begun. The DC-8 used by Flight 173 
was a fully functional, mechanically sound air&ame that 
crashed because the humans flying the machine channelized 
their attention towards a burned-out light bulb. The pilot 
became so absorbed in the burned-out bulb that he forgot to 
fly the plane. As a result of this mishap and many similar 
ones, a new training program was implemented that sought 
to capture and minimize human iiailty. Cockpit Resource 
Management (CRM) had been what researchers thought at 
the time a solution to break the human error chain. CRM has 
been in place for over 30 years and is universally taught to 
aircrews around the world. It is a process that is accepted 
and has been attributed to significantly reducing aviation 
accidents. In fact, the number of pilot error induced airline 
mishaps declined between 1983 and 2002 decreased 40 
percent. (Parsons, 2008) 
Crew Resource Management 
CRM is defined as the effective use of all resources 
to minimize errors, improve safety and improve 
performance. (Helmreich, Klinect, & Wilhelm, 1999) CRM 
can be traced back to a 1979 workshop sponsored by NASA 
entitled Resource Management on the Flightdeck in 
response to the number of air mishaps due to crew error. 
The latest accident at the time had been United Airlines 
Flight 173. The research presented at this meeting identified 
the human error aspects of the majority of the air crashes as 
failures of interpersonal communications, decision making, 
and leadership. It was at this meeting that the label CRM 
was used. It was also at this meeting that many air carriers 
became committed to develop training programs to enhance 
the interpersonal aspects of flight operations. 
CRM evolved significantly since United Airlines 
initiated the first comprehensive U.S. program in 198 1. The 
first iterations of Cockpit Resource Management focused on 
changing individual styles and correcting deficiencies in 
individual behavior such as lack of assertiveness in junior 
crewmembers and authoritarian behavior in senior pilots. 
These programs initially encountered resistance h m  some 
pilots, who denounced them as "charm school" or attempts 
to manipulate their personalities. (Helmreich, Merritt, & 
Wilhelm, 1996) 
CRM training later became a process that required 
human factors be addressed in each aspect of flight training. 
As part of the latest generation of CRM, several airlines 
have made particular concepts into procedure to ensure 
proper decisions and actions are performed based on CRM 
considerations. CRM training is now more accepted across 
the aviation industry and a standard in training programs 
throughout civilian and military flight training as well as 
other careers including medical, fire fighting, and others that 
require risk analysis. 
Still, research suggests that 80% of all aviation 
accidents continue to be the result of some form of human 
error. Development of new technology such as Synthetic 
Vision Systems (SVS) that allow a GPS overlay view of the 
terrain are direct results of these accidents and are designed 
to prevent, intervene, andlor mitigate pilot error. These new 
technologies require a modification to the original CRM 
model to allow for the added information and capabilities. 
Barrien to Effective CRM 
CRM is a process that allows crews to overcome 
challenges to day to day operations as well as effectively 
handle unforeseen situations. Barriers to effective CRM 
minimh the crews' ability to handle an event in a safe and 
timely manner. Barriers are any factors that inhibit 
communication, situational awareness, decision making and 
teamwork. Barriers can be external (physical) or internal 
(prejudice, opinions, attitudes, stress). Once these barriers 
are identified, crew can then properly apply appropriate 
skills to mitigate those barriers. The difficulty lies in 
iden- the barriers, especially internal. While the 
following examples are not all inclusive, they address some 
of the common barriers crews face. 
External Barriers 
External barriers include the physical forces 
surrounding a crew in their mission. Some examples 
include: 
Weather 
Air Traffic Control 
Aircraftsystems 
Location (familiar vs. non-familiar) 
A relatively new external barrier that must be addressed 
is the congestion of the National Air Space (NAS). With the 
influx of aircraft and degraded performance of Air Traffic 
Control (ATC) equipment, airspace is at a premium, 
especially in the highly populated areas of the U.S. and 
around the world. This creates challenges that aircrews must 
face on a daily basis. It is well known that the current air 
tramportation system does not meet the growing needs of 
the 21* century. The ability of the NAS to meet future 
demands is constrained by the limited capacity caused by 
the traditional hub-and-spoke method currently utilized by 
air carriers. This bottle-neck has also led to a large number 
of corporately and privately owned air& to infiltrate the 
airways finther causing the congestion. (Federal Aviation 
Administration, 2004) 
JAAER, Winter 20 1 1 
14
Journal of Aviation/Aerospace Education & Research, Vol. 20, No. 2 [2011], Art. 1
https://commons.erau.edu/jaaer/vol20/iss2/1
DOI: https://doi.org/10.15394/jaaer.2011.1345
Accident Reduction 
The one thing that these external barriers have in 
common is that they can be observed and analyzed by all 
pertinent crewmembers, whereas internal barriers cannot 
and it is incumbent upon the individual to address the barrier 
and properly communicate histher concerns or agendas to 
the other crewmembers. 
Internal Barriers 
Internal barriers are difficult to identi@ and 
analyze. Each human being is created differently and has 
different forces acting on their lives at any given time. These 
are the issues that don't readily appear until a chain of 
events force the crewmember to react in a way that reflects 
hisher mental state or capabilities. (Federal Aviation 
Administration, 2004) Some typical internal barriers 
include: 
StresslFatigue 
o Anxiety 
o Frustration 
o Fear 
o Anger 
Task Overload I Underload (compliancy) 
Group Mindset 
"Press on Regardless" Philosophy 
Insufficient Communication 
Hazardous Attitudes 
Although CRM is a widely accepted program, there 
is a small subset of pilots that reject the concept. These 
individuals can be found in every flying environment and 
are known to their peers and leadership. Efforts at remedial 
training for these pilots have proved ineffective. It's 
incumbent upon senior leadership that these individuals not 
be put in a situation that their attitudes/personalities 
jeopardize the safety of others or be influential on junior 
crewmembers. (Helmreich & Butler, 1991) 
Is it Human Error? 
Currently there is a trend towards the notion that a 
single causal failure is an inadequate explanation in failure 
generation. (Reason, 1997) The incidence of failure 
attributed to human causes has risen h m  an estimated 20% 
in the 1960s to some 80% in the 1990s. (Hollnagel, 1993) 
Could the advent of CRM be the cause of this attribution? 
Is it simply easier for investigators to say that the pilot made 
an error or the crew made a series of errors that led to a 
mishap? This increase is believed to be a reflection of the 
increasing complexity of technical systems and the resulting 
inability of humans involved in all stages of design, 
manufacturing, and operations to exercise control over the 
system. In almost all accidents, the failure events cannot be 
attributed to a single root cause, but rather the result of the 
complex interaction that occurs between the elements. This 
complexity requires the crews to be able to deal with a range 
of nondesign emergencies which lie outside of the known 
Mure envelope designated by the engineers. (Reason, 
1990) While contingency plans may be available for many 
events, there will always be the unforeseen through the 
system which was either not considered, or possibly even 
dismissed, by designers as being so improbable as to be 
impossible. (Perrow, 1984) Thus, a full analysis of the 
causal factors cannot be truly accurate. 
Train as you Fight, Fight as you Train 
The initial introduction of CRM focused on the 
personalities and attitudes of the crew members and did not 
necessarily combine the crews in a scenario that would test 
and evaluate their "CRM" skills. Further enhancement ofthe 
program instituted simulators that focused on the crew 
interactions during normal operations and then presented 
them with one or multiple distracters (poor weather, 
mechanical malfimction, unruly passenger, etc). This gave 
the crewmembers the opportunity to apply their skills in a 
safe environment and to review their actions after the 
simulator was complete, since most events were video 
recorded for playback. The results h m  these simulator 
events eventually began to migrate to the aircraft. 
When crews are placed under stress during actual 
situations, many have said that it was at that point that their 
training went into effect. So without proper &aining, how 
can someone be in a position to let the training take effect 
and handle an emergency appropriately? It is imperative 
that crewmembers be given the proper training and the 
opportunity to put into practice the concepts learned in a 
classroom environment. 
General Aviation Resource Management 
Although the commercial aviation indushy is 
continually highlighted when an air carrier crashes, the 
number of small general aviation (GA) aircraft accidents fhr 
exceed the commercial accident.. GA accidents also account 
for a much larger number of people injured or killed. GA 
accidents can be attributed to several factors, but the most 
common hctors to emerge hmresearch conducted into GA 
accidents and incidents, are those of poor judgment and 
decision making. The single-pilot operations in GA are 
arguably one of the most demanding civil aviation tasks. 
Traditional GA training does not incorporate the 
CRM skills, but rather the technical aspects of fight and an 
individual's skills to manipulate the aircraft in a safe 
manner. Those skills concentrated on by the use of CRM are 
just now being utilized in small a i d  and single pilot 
operations. A research panel concluded that providing a 
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CRM based training to singlepilots would improve their 
decision making processes, leading to an overall reduction 
in the rate of accidents and incidents, and to an improvement 
in the efficiency of flight operations. This finding was 
consistent with a study by Alan Diehl which found that 
judgment training can lead to a significant reduction in 
aircrew error. (Diehl, 1990) 
There is a push to require GA pilots to attend some 
form of CRM training tailored to meet the demands of 
single-pilot operations. One concern of this is that there is 
the likelihood that the training will only be a "check in the 
box" and not truly meet the needs to train the pilots properly 
enough to be effective. However, if the program is 
developed in a manner as to require some form of 
observable evaluation, surely there will be an efkdive tool 
in reducing the large number of GA accidents. 
Technology and CRM 
Shortly after the dawn of manned flight, aviators 
began to acknowledge the limitations of flight based on 
weather conditions. Instrumentation and ground-based radio 
navigation aids were developed to assist and eventually 
replace out the window information during IMC. An 
example of one such aid is the Instrument Landing System 
(ILS). The ILS consists of two radio beams that present both 
lateral and vertical course guidance information. The goal of 
the pilot flying the ILS is to keep the aircraft centered on 
this course until decision height (DH), a predetermined 
height above the ground. 
To assist the pilot in flying the ILS, a flight director 
system was later developed to calculate a course that allows 
the aircraft to intercept and fly the ILS signal down to DH. 
The change in roll and pitch calculated by the flight director 
is then presented to the pilot by pitch and roll bars on the 
attitude indicator. The flight director provides improved 
course guidance, but is not intuitive and provides very little 
real time situational awareness. 
The next large breakthrough was the incorporation 
of a Heads Up Display (HUD). The HUD allowed a level of 
integration not before possible by superimposing flight 
symbology on either a panel- or head-mounted display. 
Instead of using the panel-mounted AD1 for attitude 
indication, the HUD allows presentation of attitude 
information with an artificial horizon which is conformal 
with the outside scene, with additional information 
immediately available on one display. The HUD also 
pments the K i t  path idbrmation (the actual direction of 
the aircraft vs. orientation of the aircraft), allowing for a 
more intuitive method of control. With this flight path 
display, the pilot can determine required trajectory needed 
to intercept desired course (Foyle, Ahumada, Larimer, & 
Sweet, 1992). 
Currently, with GPS navigation and approaches becoming 
the norm in aviation, the integration of moving maps and 
overlay approaches provide the aircrew with a top down 
view of the surrounding area, normally displayed on 
either a stand-alone GPS or via a multi-function display 
(MFD). This provides improved situational awareness 
based on the aircraft's position over the ground, but does 
not provide pertinent real-time information in relation to 
the aircraft's attitude or current trajectory. 
Synthetic Vision Systems 
Synthetic Vision Systems (SVS) are aimaft 
technologies that depict computer generated displays of 
terrain surrounding an aircraft in order to provide a visual 
solution instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) 
to prevent incidents such as controlled flight into temin or 
loss of situational awareness. Improved pilot situational 
awareness (SA) during low visibility conditions is 
potentially offered by SVS displays because of the natural 
cues oEmd by a 3D perspective of the outside world 
showing unlimited ceiling and visibility conditions. New 
technological developments innavigation performance, low- 
cost attitude and heading r e h c e  systems, computational 
capabilities, and display hardware allow for the prospect of 
SVS displays for virtually all aircraft classes. 
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A fundamenrally new approach is needed to Sully 
integrate the human-machine interface. While it is unlikely 
that conventional display concepts can significantly increase 
safety as new technology cannot simply be laye~ed onto 
previous concepts since the current system coniplexitier ate 
already toet high (Thetinissen, 1997). One such apprtjach 
applies the funhenta l  advantage of perspective fli&tpath 
displays relative to cttnventionaf displays. Rather then 
directing the pilot what to do, SVS navigational displays can 
now provide infomgnation about the margins within which the 
pilot is allowed to operate. 'lbese additional display 
clemen~s provide guidance thal does not force the pilot to 
apply a continuous compenmtory control strategy. 
Only in this way can human flexibility be 
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Conclusion 
Uncertainties, intrusions, and general distractions 
all pose a significant threat to the safe operation of an 
air&. Fortunately there are concepts developedto provide 
checks and balances to establish and maintain safe 
operations. Pilot induced mishaps do still occur, but at a far 
lower rate than during the period prior to the inception of 
CRM. Is any rate other than zero an acceptable number? 
No, but crews now are more equipped with the tools to 
make sound decisions based on conditions and personal 
experience. What can never be fully understood is the total 
number of aircraft and lives that have been saved because of 
the implementation of CRM. There are many examples of 
crews working diligently to get a crippled aircrafl safely on 
the ground. Most recently, the crew of US Airways Flight 
1549 safely ditched an Airbus A320 into the Hudson River 
after losing all thrust in both engines. The pilot had been 
instrumental in the integration of CRM at the airline, and 
fully believes the concepts and skills learned aided their 
ability to safely land the airplane. 
The crew members of the flights at the beginning 
of .this report were experiencing two different situations. 
One crew focused their attention on troubleshooting an 
emergency they thought could have serious consequences; 
the other crew, complacent, failed to use available resources 
to verify their location prior to departure. Another difference 
is that the second crew had been trained to use CRM to 
become more acute@ aware of their surround'lngs, 
unfortunately they failed to maintain a sharp awareness. 
However, both met similar fates. For CRM to be successful, 
it must be incorporated all the time, every time. The skills 
and concepts must not be watered down or allowed to decay 
over time. Management must support it and those that 
evaluate the process must enforce its practice. General 
aviatom need to fully comprehend the CRM process. New 
technologies such as SVS need to be readily available to 
both commercial and civilian aviation. We as human beings 
will continue to make mistakes, but by utilizing the concepts 
and practices of CRM and ensuring they are adhered to 
during all phases of aircraft operations; we can see a decline 
in aviation mishaps and prevent further accidents..) 
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